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STA TEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Petitioner-Appellant Zane Jack Fields appeals from the district court's
Memorandum and Order of Dismissal based upon allegations in his "Petition for PostConviction Scientific Testing," in which he contended DNA evidence found under the
victim's fingernails and DNA testing of hair found on her clothing establish his
mnocence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal And First Post-Conviction
Proceedings
The material facts leading to Fields' conviction for the first-degree murder of
Mary Katherine Vanderford and his sentence of death are summarized in State v. Fields,
127 Idaho 904, 907-09, 908 P.2d 1211 (1995) (Fields I), and will be further discussed in
detail in the argument below.
An Information was filed charging Fields with Mary's first-degree murder based
upon the felony-murder doctrine (##19185119809, R., pp.17-18).J

Fields' trial

commenced May 2, 1990, and was completed May 16, 1990, after which the jury found
him guilty as charged. (Id., pp.67-104.)

J Because there are multiple records and transcripts in this appeal, the state will refer to
the records and transcripts by their respective supreme court docket numbers. The
supreme court docket numbers for Fields' underlying trial, sentencing and first postconviction case are ##19185 and 19809. The supreme court docket number for Fields'
first successive post-conviction case is #24119. The supreme court docket number for his
second successive post-conviction case is #35679. The supreme court docket number for
his third success post-conviction case, and subject of the instant appeal, is #36508.
"Brief' refers to Fields' opening brief in the instant case.
1

On July 17, 1990, Fields filed a Motion for New Trial, contending an inmate,
Salvador Martinez, advised he overheard two state witnesses, Joe Heistand and Scott
Bianchi, and another inmate, Raymond Gilcrist, who did not testify at Fields' trial, state
"they had lied, or intended to lie, at Fields' trial in exchange for promised benefits from
the authorities."

(##19185119809, pp.108-12.)

After an evidentiary hearing (id.,

pp.1716-1905), the district court denied Fields' motion, concluding Martinez's testimony
"was not believable to this court and would not be believable to a jury" and "the
testimony of the inmate witnesses that they had not spoken to Mr. Martinez is credible"
(id., pp.144-49).
After Fields' sentencing hearing (## 19185119809, pp.1907-08), the district court
found the state had proven three statutory aggravating factors and, after weighing the
collective mitigation against the statutory aggravating factors individually, the court
sentenced Fields to death on March 7, 1991 (id., pp.164-77).
On

April

18,

1991,

Fields

filed

his

first

post-conviction

petition.

(##19185119809, pp.197-203.) An amended petition was subsequently filed making one
additional claim. (Id., pp.218-19.) After conducting an evidentiary hearing (id., pp.22124), the district court denied Fields' claims, but withdrew the "utter disregard" statutory
aggravating factor because of the Ninth Circuit's erroneous conclusion that it was
unconstitutionally vague, see Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873, 881 (9 th Cir. 1991) (id.,
pp.226-235)?

Fields filed another amended petition and motion for new trial

(##19185119809, Supp. R., pp.9-1O), which was also denied after another evidentiary
hearing (id., pp.58-62).

The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Arave v.
Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993).
2

2

On February 16, 1995, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Fields' conviction,
sentence and denial of post-conviction relief. Fields I, supra.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' First Successive Post-Conviction Case
After filing a federal writ of habeas corpus, Fields returned to state court and filed
his first successive post-conviction petition. (#24119, R., pp.4-51.) The district court
concluded Fields failed to satisfy the requirements of I.C. § 19-2719 because his claims
were known or reasonably could have been known when he filed his first post-conviction
petition, and entered a final order denying relief. (Id., pp.87-96, 130-35.) The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision denying post-conviction relief on
September 7, 2000. Fields v. State, 135 Idaho 286,17 P.3d 230 (2000) (Fields II).

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition
On August 2, 2002, relying upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), Fields
filed a "Petition for Post-Conviction Relief or Writ of Habeas Corpus" and "Motions to
Correct Illegal Sentences, to Vacate Sentences of Death and for New Sentencing TriaL"
(#35679, R., pp.5-14.) The state filed a response asking that the petition be dismissed
because Ring does not apply retroactively (id., pp.37-46), which the district court
granted, concluding Ring is not retroactive to cases in collateral review and the petition is
"expressly barred by Idaho Code Section 19-2719" (id., pp.293-304). Fields' appeal of
the district court's decision remains pending before the Idaho Supreme Court.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Fields' Third And Instant Successive Post-Conviction
Petition
On June 27, 2002, Fields filed his instant Petition for Post-Conviction Scientific
Testing, requesting testing of "three distinct pieces of evidence" including DNA testing
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of Fields' coat admitted at trial as exhibit 22, comparison of nineteen latent fingerprints
taken from the murder scene with a national fingerprint data base ("AFIS") and DNA
testing of fingernail scrapings from Mary's body. (#36508, R., pp.7-14.) The coat was
tested by the Idaho State Police Forensic Lab (id., pp.64-65), but it was determined there
was an inadequate sample to do additional testing (id., pp. 77, 92).
Fields responded by filing a Motion for Production of Documents (#36508, R.,
pp.117-20) and Motion for Access to Evidence requesting "access to all of the evidence
collected by the police to determine what additional items merit DNA or fingerprint
testing," particularly "access to the sex assault kit with samples taken from the victim in
this case" (id., pp.123-31), which the district court generally granted (id., pp.l51-54).
After additional testing and comparisons were completed, the state filed a Motion
to Dismiss asserting the testing and comparisons failed to produce results favorable to
Fields. (#36508, R., pp.l76-78.) Fields responded by acknowledging DNA testing was
completed on three hairs found on Mary's clothing and scrapings under her fingernails,
but contending, because the testing allegedly excluded him as the donor of the DNA, he
had established his innocence or was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (Id., pp.195220.) On April 3, 2009, the district court granted the state's Motion to Dismiss after
"examining all the admissible evidence" and recognizing "there was no evidence that
[Fields] had been scratched," and that "the victim worked in a small retail establishment
open to the public [and therefore] the fact that [Fields] has been excluded as the producer
of the DNA from these sources does not exclude him from committing the crimes
alleged." (Id., pp.257-61.) Fields filed a timely Notice of Appeal on May 15,2009. (Id.,
pp.262-65.)

4

ISSUE
Fields has stated the issue on appeal as follows:
Has Fields shown that it is more probable than not that he would
be acquitted by any reasonable juror and that no reasonable juror would
vote to convict when considering the new evidence together with all
admissible evidence. Alternatively, Fields is entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to establish his innocence.
(Brief, p.3.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows:
Because neither Fields' new DNA evidence nor his new affidavits from three
witnesses who testified at trial, whether viewed collectively or individually with the
evidence presented at trial, would probably produce an acquittal, has he failed to establish
the district court erred by summarily dismissing his successive post-conviction petition?

5

ARGUMENT
Fields Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing His
Successive Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
Based upon newly obtained DNA evidence from Mary's fingernail scraping and

three hairs found on her clothing, coupled with new affidavits from three trial witnesses,
Fields contends the district court erred by summarily dismissing his post-conviction
petition and that he is entitled to a new trial or, alternatively, an evidentiary hearing.
Because Fields proffered no evidence establishing Mary scratched her murderer,
he has failed to establish the origin of the DNA from the fingernail scrapings warrants
either an evidentiary hearing or new trial. Moreover, he has failed to argue, let alone
establish, any evidentiary value associated with the three stray hairs found on Mary's
clothing at the time of the autopsy. Finally, because the three affidavits from the trial
witnesses are merely cumulative or impeaching and were known or could have been
known with reasonable diligence at the time of Fields' trial, they cannot be considered in
determining whether he is entitled to a new trial or evidentiary hearing. However, even if
considered, because the affidavits are nothing more than a regurgitation of the basic facts
presented at trial, they fail to establish, whether collectively or individually, that they
would probably produce an acquittal.

B.

Standard Of Review
"This Court has free review of questions of law." Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho

247, ---, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009). Additionally, in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho
789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108 (2004) (quoting Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 900
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P.2d 795 (1995», the supreme court reaffirmed the standard of review in post-conviction
cases in which summary dismissal was granted by the trial court:
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly
granted, a court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the
petitioner, and determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if
accepted as true. A court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted
allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions. The
standard to be applied to a trial court's determination that no material issue
of fact exists is the same type of determination as in a summary judgment
proceeding. (Citations omitted throughout.)

C.

Applicable Legal Standards
1.

Post-Conviction

'" [P]etitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure.'"

Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642 (2008)

(quoting Storm v. State, 112 Idaho 718, 720, 735 P.2d 1029 (1987».

"Like the plaintiff

in a civil case, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based." State v. Yakovac, 146 Idaho
437, 443, 180 P.3d 476 (2008).
However, a post-conviction petition differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil
action because the petition must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of
the claim." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376 (2004). "The application
must be present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or
the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199
P.3d 123 (2008).

Bare or conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any fact, are

inadequate to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing. Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho
156,159,715 P.2d 369 (et. App. 1986); Stone v. State, 108 Idaho 822, 826, 702 P.2d
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860 (Ct. App. 1985). The district court may also take judicial notice of the records,
transcripts and exhibits from the underlying criminal case. Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736,
739,747 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 115 Idaho 315,766 P.2d 895 (1988), overruled

on other grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992); Matthews v.
State, 122 Idaho 801, 808, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992).
Idaho Code § 19-4906(c) states, "The court may grant a motion by either party for
summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any
affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "Summary dismissal of an application is the
procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." Yakovac, 145 Idaho at
444.

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present

evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278
(2003). "A 'prima facie case' means the 'production of enough evidence to allow the
fact-finder to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor.'" Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at
728 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1209 (Bryan A. Garner ed.,

i h ed., West 1999)).

"However, summary dismissal may be appropriate even where the State does not
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the
applicant's merely conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
applicant's conclusions of law." Payne, 146 Idaho at 561 (internal quotes and citations
omitted); see also Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, ---, 227 P.3d 925, 929 (2010).
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2.

Newly Discovered Fingerprint And DNA Evidence

In 2001, the Idaho Legislature amended the UPCP A by adding a new provision
permitting petitioners to seek fingerprint or DNA testing "on evidence that was secured
in relation to the trial which resulted in his or her conviction but which was not subject to
the testing that is now requested because the technology for the testing was not available
at the time of trial." 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.317, § 3, pp.1129-30 (codified at I.C. §
19-4902(b)). "In the event the fingerprint or forensic DNA test results demonstrate, in
light of all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is not the person who committed the
offense, the court shall order the appropriate relief." Id. (codified at I.C. § 19-4902(e)).
This new provision for fingerprint and DNA testing also applies to capital cases, but is
"subject to the procedures set forth in [I.e. § 19-2719], and must be pursued through a
petition filed within the time limitations of [I.C. § 19-2719(3)] or by July 1, 2002,
whichever is later." 2001 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch.317, § 1, p.1127 (codified at I.e. § 192719(4)).
Presumably, once the requirements for testing under I.C. § 19-4902(c) and (d)
have been met and the testing has been completed, because the fingerprint and DNA
claims are premised upon newly discovered evidence, Fields must establish the evidence
meets the four-part test from State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972 (1976),
which includes, "that the newly discovered evidence was unknown to the defendant at the
time of trial; the evidence is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; the evidence
will probably produce an acquittal; and the failure to learn of the evidence was due to no
lack of diligence on the part of the defendant." Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 30, 995
P.2d 794 (2000).
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However, even if the four-part Drapeau standard is not applicable and this Court
adopts the federal habeas standard under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995),
Fields must meet a very high standard. As explained by the Supreme Court:
To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it is
more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted in
light of the new evidence. The petitioner thus is required to make a
stronger showing than that needed to establish prejudice. At the same
time, the showing of "more likely than not" imposes a lower burden of
proof than the "clear and convincing" standard required under Sawyer.
Id. 513 u.S. at 327 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
In Schlup, the Court made several observations regarding the actual innocence
standard. First, in assessing the adequacy of a petitioner's showing, the court is not
bound by the rules of admissibility that would govern at trial. "Instead, the emphasis on
'actual innocence' allows the reviewing tribunal also to consider the probative force of
relevant evidence that was either excluded or unavailable at trial." Id. The reviewing
court makes its determination "in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have
been illegally admitted (but with due regard to any unreliahility of it) and evidence
tenably claimed to have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after
the trial." Id. at 328.
Second, the reasonable doubt standard is not discarded.

Rather, "the analysis

must incorporate the understanding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt marks the legal
boundary between guilt and innocence." Id.
Third, the standard is not based upon the mere showing that reasonable doubt
exists in light of the new evidence. Rather, the Court explained the standard is:
[T]hat no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty. It is not
the district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable doubt
exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard requires the district
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court to make a probabilistic determination about what reasonable,
properly instructed jurors would do. Thus, a petitioner does not meet the
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of
the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 329.
Finally, the Court highlighted the word "reasonable," noting, "It must be
presumed that a reasonable juror would consider fairly all of the evidence presented. It
must be presumed that such a juror would conscientiously obey the instructions of the
trial court requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that this standard "is not easy to meet,"
Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1086 (9 th Cir. 2002), and is "narrow" in scope,
Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 990 (9 th Cir. 2000). Further, "[t]o be credible, a claim
of actual innocence must be based on reliable evidence not presented at trial." Id. at 982.
Because such evidence is rare, "in virtually every case, the allegation of actual innocence
has been summarily rejected." Id. Further, the Eighth Circuit has concluded not only
must the evidence be new because it was unavailable at trial, the petitioner must establish
it could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. Amrine
v. Bowersox, 128 F.3d 1222, 1230 (8 th Cir. 1997); Morris v. Dormire, 217 F.3d 556,559
(8 th Cir. 2000); see also Lyons v. Lee, 316 F.3d 528, 533 (4 th Cir. 2003).

D.

The Compelling Evidence Presented At Fields' Trial
Fields' contention that the evidence presented at trial was "very weak" (Brief, p.6)

is simply not true. While the state's case may not have been overwhelming, such as cases
that establish guilt with a confession to law enforcement, DNA or fingerprint evidence,
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ballistics testing or an eyewitness who actually saw the murder, as demonstrated below, it
was certainly very compelling.
On February 11, 1988, at approximately 11 :00 a.m., Mary's husband, Herbert
Vanderford, left his wife working at the Wishing Well gift shop in Boise, Idaho, which
was owned by their daughter, Karen Vanderford.

(##19185119809, Tr., pp.916-18.)

Mary was still alive when Herbert left that morning. (Id., p.917.) On that same date at
11: 18 a.m., dispatcher Jackie Pyle received a 911 telephone call from Mary stating, "I've
just been stabbed. I'm bleeding." (Id., p.997.) Mary was able to explain she had been
stabbed in the neck and chest, her assailant was no longer at the shop, the assailant was
male and she had been robbed. (Id., pp.997-99.)
During Mary's 911 call, Ralph Simmons entered the store and saw her "propped
up against the corner" of the counter "sitting on her legs in a crouched position facing the
window ... toward the front of the store" with a "telephone in one hand and her other
hand was to her throat." (##19185119809, Tr., pp.l008-10.) Simmons "saw a lot of
blood on the front of [Mary's] blouse and sweater. There was blood on her hand that was
holding her throat and blood on the hand that was holding the telephone." (Id., p.1 011.)
Simmons took the phone from Mary, spoke with the dispatcher and tried to administer
first aid. (Id., pp.999-1000, 1011-12.) Mary stated and gestured that her assailant had
fled through the front door. (Id., pp.1012-13.)
Ada County Detective Randy Folwell was the first law enforcement officer to
arrive and found Mary with Simmons trying to assist her. (##19185119809, Tr., pp.102122.) While Mary was unable to speak, she moved her head and confirmed her assailant
was male, no longer in the store and alone. (Id., p.1 022.) Emergency medical personnel
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dispatched to the Wishing Well administered first aid and transported Mary to Saint
Alphonsus Hospital. CId., pp.1 038-44.)
Upon arrival at the emergency room, Mary was in full cardiac arrest and
"bleeding quite a bit from a stab wound in the right side of her neck." (##19185119809,
Tr., p.1091.) Pressure was placed on Mary's neck to stop the bleeding and she was
immediately transported to the operating room, however, she could not be resuscitated.
CId., p.l 093.) Mary was pronounced dead approximately forty-five minutes after first
arriving at the emergency room from the "stab wound in her neck [which] caused her to
lose enough blood that she was not able to sustain adequate blood pressure. She basically
bled to death." (Id., p.1 094.)
Dr. Frank Roberts completed an autopsy of Mary's body the following day and
found six wounds on her body, including: (1) "a long incised, ... cleanly cut wound that
extended from behind the right ear and came around under the right side of the chin"; (2)
"a puncture-type wound located just above the nipple of the right breast"; (3) "a puncture
wound located just on the back at approximately - slightly lower than the one on the
breast"; (4) "[t]he fourth was six inches towards the middle of the body and just slightly
lower than the No.3"; (5) "[t]he fifth was a small laceration between the eyebrows"; and

(6) the sixth wound was "located on the top of the ring finger of the left hand" and was a
"defensive wound." (##19185119809, Tr., pp.l061-63.) Dr. Roberts opined a "knifelike
instrument" caused all six wounds. CId., p.l 067.) Dr. Roberts concurred with Dr. Fazzio
that Mary bled to death from the major wounds caused by the "knifelike instrument."
(Id., pp.l074-7S.)
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In February 1988, a Shopko customer observed a man attempting to steal a
cassette tape who was wearing a "distinctive orange camouflage jacket." State v. Fields,
115 Idaho 1101, 1102, 772 P.2d 739 (et. App. 1989).

While the specifics of this

"Shopko incident" were not presented to the jury in the murder case, the jacket, which
was confiscated at the time of the "Shopko incident," was admitted during the murder
trial. (##19185119809, Tr., p.1171.) At least one witness, Keith Edson, identified the
coat as being worn by Fields on the morning of Mary's murder. (ld., p.1218.) Ann
Bradley, a forensic scientist, examined Fields' jacket and found two "extremely small"
spots that, in a "preliminary screening" tested positive for blood.

(Id., pp.1407-12.)

While Bradley was unable to determine whether the blood was human, she explained that
did not necessarily mean it was not human blood. (Id., pp.141 0-11.)
To further establish Fields murdered Mary, the state called a number of witnesses
who were in or near the Wishing Well on the morning of her murder. Edson testified he
saw Fields go into the Wishing Well on the morning of Mary's murder, but, because he
could not remember who it was, waited to report the sighting until February 22, 1988,
after watching the news and hearing the name "Zane," which triggered Edson's memory.
(##19185119809, Tr., pp.1197-1214.) Edson had met Fields while both were in prison.
(Id., pp.1190-92.) Edson reported the sighting to police and identified Fields from a
photo array and subsequently in court. (Id., pp.1214-18.) Edson also identified the coat
taken from Fields during the "Shopko incident" as the coat Fields was wearing when
entering the Wishing Well. (Id., p.1218.)
Betty Hornecker was at the Wishing Well at approximately 11 :00 a.m. and saw a
man enter the store who "immediately went" to the back of the store "farthest from the
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door." (##19185119809, Tr., p.929.) Hornecker kept her eyes on him "all the time"
because "his presence made me very uneasy and I also felt like he was trying to avoid me
and move around the store." (Id., p.929.) While Hornecker could not positively identify
Fields as the man, the description she provided fit Field's general description.

(Id.,

pp.932-34, 954-55.) Mari Munk, who was in the Wishing Well shortly after Hornecker,
provided a similar description, although she did not see the man's face. (Id., pp.967-73.)
Nancy Miller, who worked at the Quilt Crossing, a fabric store two blocks from
the Wishing Well, testified that at approximately 12:30 p.m. on the day of Mary's
murder, a man entered the Quilt Crossing "searching and looking very wild-eyed."
(##19185119809, Tr., pp.l100-01.) The man's description fit Fields, who was wearing an
orange coat and jeans with a knife in the coat with a brown wooden handle.

(Id.,

pp.ll03-04.) On February 24, 1988, Miller identified Fields as the man in the shop from
a series of photographs shown her by police and subsequently identified him in court.
(Id., pp.ll 05-08.)

Miller also identified a coat obtained from Fields as the coat he was

wearing in her shop. (Id., pp.l109-1 0.) Miller explained that after Fields left her store,
he approached the neighboring T-Shirt Plus shop. (Id., p.1122.)
Vicky Tippetts testified a man came into her shop, T-Shirts Plus, at approximately
12:30 p.m. Tippetts' attention was drawn to the man because "when he first came in he
came and stood right by the cash register and stared at me."

(##19185119809, Tr.,

p.1128.) After stating Tippetts could not help him, the man "looked at me, looked at the
register, looked at the people in the shop and then he looked at me and looked at the
register." (Id., p.1128.) Tippetts was frightened because "[h]is eyes were very wild
looking. They were just very scary eyes to look at. They were evil." (Id., p.1128.)
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Tippets provided the same general description of the man as the pnor witnesses,
acknowledged she had identified the man in a photo array and subsequently identified
Fields in court. (Id., pp.1132-35.)

Like Miller, Tippetts also identified a coat obtained

from Fields as the coat he was wearing in her shop. (Id., pp.1136-37.)
Robert Starbard, an employee at the Videon, a video store near the Wishing Well,
testified that at approximately 12:30 p.m. on the afternoon of Mary's murder, a man also
came into his shop "act[ing] real nervous." (#19185119809, Tr., p.1150.) Starbard had
received a telephone call about the robbery at the Wishing Well at 12:15 p.m. (Id.,
p.1151.) After giving a general description of the man that matched Fields, Starbard later
identified him as the man from a photo array and subsequently identified him in court.
(Id., pp.1154, 1159-61.)

Starbard was so concerned about Fields' appearance and

mannerisms that he contacted store manager Timothy McWilliams.

(Id., p.1158.)

Mc Williams testified regarding his contact with Starbard, gave a general description of
the man and identified the man as Fields from a photo array. (Id., pp.1180-85.)
Detective Dave Smith testified regarding information that was provided to the
media, which did not include information regarding whether money had been taken from
the Wishing Well, the location of any money taken from the Wishing Well, the motive
for Mary's murder or the amount of money taken from the Wishing Well.

(State's

lodging A-41, pp.1369-70.)
Jeffrey Acheson, an inmate at the Idaho State Penitentiary (#19185/19809, Tr.,
p.1420), testified that in late March 1988, Fields initiated several conversations regarding
Mary's murder after the show, Crimestoppers, came on television. (Id., pp.1428-30.)
During the show Fields "would sometimes go up and either change the channel, turn the
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TV off, or turn the volume down." (ld., p.1430.) Fields' behavior was "[v]ery full of
anxiety, pretty angry sometimes." (ld., p.1430.) After changing channels or "calm[ing]
down," Fields would say, "They can't pin that on me," or "They're trying to pin that on
me but I took care of that." (Id., pp.1430-31.) Fields indicated "they wouldn't be able to
link him with the [murder]" because "he had taken care of the evidence." (Id., p.1431.)
Another inmate, Joe Heistand, also testified regarding conversations initiated by
Fields between May 2-10, 1989, while they were both in custody. (##19185119809, Tr.,
pp.14 71-73.) Fields told Heistand "what the store looked like, who was running the
store, where it was located" and that he "had been by it a few times ... OJust to look at it
for a possible score," meaning "a theft or something of that nature . . . [b ]urglary,
robbery, whatever." (Id., pp.1477-79.) Fields had learned "that an older lady ran the
store" and that "[w]hen he had seen her she was in there alone." (Id., p.1479.) Fields
told Heistand, "[he] entered the store, went to the back of the store where the till area was
and was getting the money. The lady from the store came from the back room, startled
him - and screaming and hollering. She was asked to cooperate, nothing would happen,
and she didn't cooperate and that's when the stabbing occurred." (Id., p.1480.)

Fields

stated he stabbed her "[i)n the neck and upper shoulder, upper back area ... a few times"
with "an old hickory butcher knife." (Id., p.1481.) Fields acknowledged getting "48 to
50 bucks" in "[p)aper and change." (Id., pp.1481-82.) Fields conceded when he left
Mary was "still alive" and people were in the area of the store that could have seen the
knife. (Id., p.1482.)
A third inmate, Scott Bianchi, also testified that on November 10, 1989, while he
and Fields were in custody together, Fields initiated a conversation regarding Mary's
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murder, stating, "he killed the lady, that he didn't mean to kill her, and that he felt really
bad for her." (##19185119809, Tr., p.l569.) Fields explained the murder occurred "in
the Linda Vista Plaza" in a "gift shop." (Id., p.1569.) Fields stated, "he got startled and
he acted on impulse ... he said once he got started it was like he had to finish the job."
(Id., p.1570.)

E.

Fields Has Failed To Establish The DNA Evidence Regarding The Fingernail
Scrapings And Three Hairs Would Probably Produce An Acquittal
Fields' principle argument surrounding the fingernail scrapings is based upon Dr.

Frank Roberts' testimony describing "Wound No.6," which "was a linear injury on the
top of [Mary's] ring finger" described as a "defensive wound." (##19185119809, Tr.,
p.1063.) Fields contends, "[gJiven Mrs. Vanderford's defensive cut and the presence of
male DNA in her fingernail scrapings, it is a reasonable inference that she scratched her
attacker."

(Brief, p.13.)

However, Dr. Roberts' testimony does not come close to

supporting such an inference. As explained by Dr. Roberts, "Sometimes when people are
being attacked they put their hands up to defend themselves, and this appeared to be
consistent with a defense wound." (##19185119809, p.l063.) Putting one's hands "up"
to defend against an attacker is in stark contrast to actually scratching the attacker such
that DNA would be collected under Mary's fingernails. Fields' contention is based upon
a bare and conclusory allegation supported by no evidence. There is nothing about Dr.
Roberts' description of the wound establishing Fields' DNA should be underneath
Mary's fingernails.

At best, the testimony establishes the knife Fields used touched

Mary's hand, not that her fingernails scratched his skin.
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Moreover, there is no evidence establishing the manner in which the DNA was
collected from Mary's body during the autopsy. While there is certainly evidence the
DNA was collected from scrapings, there is no evidence establishing how the scrapings
were retrieved.

It is certainly plausible that DNA from the top or edge of Mary's

fingernail is what was retrieved, and, based upon the fact that she worked in a public
setting where she would have contact with many people, it is more probable the DNA
was from one of her customers either through direct contact, like shaking hands, or some
other manner such as the exchange of money, neither of which are any more speculative
than Fields' contention that Mary scratched the murderer. This was not a sexual assault
case where DNA evidence from the attacker is sometimes found in fingernail scrapings
because of the close proximity of the rapist with his victim. Rather this was a robbery
where Fields used a knife to murder Mary and she attempted to fend off that attack with
her hand. Irrespective, because Fields failed to explain how the DNA was collected or
otherwise provide any evidence supporting his contention that Mary scratched her
attacker, his argument fails.
Apparently recognizing any argument regarding the stray hairs found on Mary's
clothing would be even more dubious, Fields does not address the three hairs or
otherwise explain why they should be attributed to her murderer. Obviously, particularly
since Mary worked in a public setting, the three hairs could have come from anyone.
There is simply no evidence to support an inference that the hairs came from Mary's
murderer, particularly since there is no evidence explaining how they were collected.
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F.

New Affidavits Provided By Fields' Investigator Cannot Be Considered
Apparently, recognizing the futility of his new "forensic" evidence, Fields

attempts to bolster his claim with new affidavits from Betty Heaton 3 dated September 26,
2003 (#36508, R., pp.221-24), Mari Munk dated October 2, 2003 (id., pp.225-28), and
Jeffrey Acheson dated July 16, 2004 (id., p.275, exhibit 9, attachment D), all witnesses
who testified at Fields' trial.
At Fields' trial, Heaton detailed her actions on the morning of Mary's murder
beginning with an errand to the Max Store. (##19185119809, Tr., p.925.) After attending
to other errands, Heaton arrived at the Wishing Well "[r]ight around eleven, give or take
one or two minutes at the most." (Id., p.927.) Before entering the Wishing Well, Heaton
"saw a man that had looked like he had just finished washing the windows and going
around the corner of the store outside." (Id.) Heaton also saw a second man who "left,"
and spoke with a "lady [that] appeared to ... be ... in charge." (Id.) A third man came
in the store and "very quickly" went to the back of the store "farthest from the door."
(Id., pp.928-29.) Heaton noted the man "doesn't look like he fits in the store," and that
Mary "came over right away and started to talk to him."

(Id., p.929.) Heaton further

explained, "I kept an eye on him all the time. I felt his presence made me very uneasy
and I also felt like he was trying to avoid me and moved around the store, and I just tried
to avoid him." (Id., p.930.) When asked if she saw the man's face, Heaton testified she
"took a look ... across the room" and saw his face "[fJive to ten seconds maybe at the
most."

(Id., p.931.)

In describing the man, Heaton stated, "he was a large man in

comparison to Mrs. Vanderford," and "guessed" he was "six-four" and "probably the

3

Heaton was known as Hornecker when she testified at Fields' trial.
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weight would be 230, 240, somewhere in that vicinity, somewhere in that, well into the
two hundreds." (Id., p.932.)

Further describing the man, Heaton testified she "thought

he was balding on the crown of his head, and definitely receding type hairline" "above
his ears," which was "[d]ark, that's all," "probably in the brownish." (Id., pp.932-33.)
Heaton could not remember seeing the man wearing a hat or face covering or whether he
had facial hair. (Id., p.933.) Describing the man's clothing, Heaton stated, "I remember
basically Navy blue is the color I think of when I look back to think of him, especially the
pants." (Id.)
Heaton attempted to develop a composite sketch of the man with law
enforcement, but explained it was not an accurate composite because "[t]he face was
fuller," "eyes aren't quite as intense," but it was "the best" she could do.
(##19185119809, Tr., pp.937-38.) When provided a photo array with six photographs,
which included Fields' photo, (id., p.258, exhibit 8), the best Heaton could say was
"[t]here are some similarities in some of them," explaining, "One, two, three, four, five,
six. Photo five, the eyes seem, to me, somewhat like this man's. Photo no. 3, I would
say the lips, the mouth and the -- between the two of them the fullness of the face,
hairline seems to be somewhat right" (id., pp.938-39). When expressly asked, "can you
say whether the person that you saw in the store is pictured in that group of photos,"
Heaton stated, "No, I cannot." (Id., p.939.)
On cross-examination, Heaton agreed the man was "white," "balding,"
"approximately six foot four," which was taller than her husband who was six-two," and
wore a "Navy blue, hooded, zip front sweat shirt." (##19185119809, Tr., p.954.) Heaton
explained she was provided a number of other photos and chose exhibit 6 (id., p.258,
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exhibit 6 (picture of Mike Weaver)), which was not a photograph of Fields, as the one she
"felt was close to the man that was in the store" (id., pp.958-60). Finally, Heaton stated
she did not think the man was wearing an orange or red camouflaged parka. (Id., p.965.)
Heaton's latest affidavit recounts her trial testimony; the basic facts are no
different than her trial testimony.

(#36508, R., pp.221-24.)

Heaton does reference

Exhibits A through D, however, contrary to her affidavit the exhibits are not attached and
are not part of the record.

(#36508, pp.221-24.)

Rather, Mari Munk's affidavit

commences immediately after the final page of Heaton's affidavit.

(#36508, p.225.)

There are some "exhibits" following the completion of Munk's affidavit, but they do not
correspond with those referenced in Heaton's affidavit. (#36508, pp.227-30.) Therefore,
Heaton's affidavit is of even less value than her trial testimony and certainly would not
"probably produce an acquittal" whether alone or in conjunction with any of the other
evidence. See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691.
More importantly, Heaton's latest affidavit does not meet two other Drapeau
elements. Not only is the content of the affidavit "merely cumulative or impeaching," but
it was known or could have been known with reasonable diligence on Fields' part at the
time of his trial. See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691. Furthermore, the affidavit is contrary to
the dictates of I.e. § 19-2719 because it was known or reasonably could have been
known at the time Fields filed his first post-conviction petition. Therefore, Heaton's
affidavit cannot even be considered in determining whether Fields has met his burden.
The same is true with Munk's latest affidavit (#36508, R., p.225); because it is
"merely cumulative or impeaching" and it was known or could have been known with
reasonable diligence on Fields' part at the time of his trial, it does not meet two of the
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elements under Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, nor can it be used under I.C. § 19-2719.
Additionally, Munk's latest affidavit is basically a regurgitation of her trial testimony,
containing no new facts that would bolster the DNA evidence. At trial, Munk explained
on the morning of Mary's murder between 10:30 and 11 :00 a.m. she was watching a
television show, Classic Concentration. (##19185/19809, Tr., p.967.) When the show
was finished, Munk went to the Wishing well, arriving "[b ]etween 11 :05 and 11: 10
maybe" to find her grandmother a birthday present. (Id., pp.967-68.) Upon entering the
shop, Munk's attention was immediately drawn to a woman who appeared to be a clerk
or employee who was on the telephone and "smiled and acknowledged" Munk. (Id.,
p.968.) Going to the rear of the shop, Munk saw a man 'Just standing there looking at the
things that were in that room." (Id., p.969.) While Munk didn't pay particular attention
to the man, she was "wondering what he was looking at." (Id.) Munk never looked at
the man's face. Munk could see the man was looking at "junk," so she "left and went
back down the other side of the store." (Id., p.970.) Munk was in the shop "[a]t most,
ten minutes," never making a purchase. (Id.) When she left, the man was still in the
store. (Id.) Describing the man's general features, Munk explained he was "big and
sloppy, about 230 pounds, over six feet, and about 48 years old." (Id., p.971.) His
clothing was "[g]rubby, sloppy, dark." (Id.) Munk was provided a photograph of Fields
at trial (trial exhibit 9) and agreed she could not say "anything about the face," and could
not "tell the height" by the photograph, but concluded "it is a fat body similar to the one
that was -- that I said." (Id., p.973.)
On cross-examination, Munk confirmed she did not look at the man's face.
(#19185119809, Tr., p.979.) Based upon the man's attire and "what he was looking at,"
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Munk thought he might be a "junk dealer." (Id., p.980.) She also confirmed she was in
the store "less than ten minutes." (ld.) Munk was also questioned regarding her husband
who was forty-one, approximately 175 pounds and six-three.

(Id., pp.983-84.)

She

explained the man in the shop was "[s]horter and heavier maybe" than her husband (id.,
p.984) and reaffirmed that belief (id., pp.984-86).
Munk's latest affidavit recounts her trial testimony (#36508, R., pp.225-26); the
basic facts are no different than her trial testimony with her recounting that the man was
"over six feet tall, about 230 lbs and 48 years old" (id., p.225).

Admittedly, Munk

contends she was shown a picture of Mike Weaver and that it "looks much more like the
man that I saw in the Wishing Well store shortly before the murder than did the
defendant, Zane Fields" (id., p.226), but because she never recants her trial testimony that
she did not get a good look at the man's face, this minor fact is of no consequence,
particularly fifteen years after Mary's murder. Clearly, Munk's 2003 affidavit is of even
less value than her trial testimony and certainly would not "probably produce an
acquittal" whether it could be used alone or in conjunction with any of the other
evidence. See Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691.
Acheson's latest affidavit is likewise unavailing.

Although Fields contends

Acheson's latest affidavit establishes "these snitch witnesses received information about
the crime from the State" (Brief, p.15) Fields' sole focus from Acheson's affidavit is the
contention that Acheson was "corrected by the investigators as to the fact that it was not a
gun but a knife that was used to do the murder" and that Acheson "never had this
information until the police told [him]." (#36508, R., p.275, exhibit 9, attachment D,
p.1.) However, like the new affidavits of Heaton and Munk, because Acheson's latest
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affidavit is "merely cumulative or impeaching" and it was known or could have been
known with reasonable diligence on Fields' part at the time of his trial, it does not meet
two of the elements under Drapeau, 97 Idaho at 691, nor can it be consi dered under I. C. §
19-2719. Moreover, considering the manner in which Acheson was impeached at trial
(#19185119809, Tr., pp.1441-56), the impeachment value of tidbits from his latest

affidavit are of dubious value.
Finally, Fields attempts to revisit many aspects of his trial and explain why, based
upon the evidence that was presented, it was impossible for him to have murdered Mary.
However, Fields' attempt fails to explain how this regurgitation of the trial evidence is
linked to the new forensic DNA evidence and is merely an attempt to rehash his version
of the evidence that was rejected by the jury's finding of guilt. More importantly, Fields
conspicuously ignores significant pieces of evidence such as Ann Bradley's finding of
blood on his jacket (#19185119809, Tr., pp.1407-12) and all of the witnesses who saw
Fields near the Wishing Well shortly after Mary's murder, including Nancy Miller (id.,
pp.1100-10), Vicky Tippetts (id., pp.1128-37), Robert Starbard (id., pp.1150-61) and
Timothy McWilliams (id., pp.1180-85).

Fields also ignores the vast majority of the

testimony from the three inmates, which included information that, according to
Detective Dave Smith, had not been disclosed to the media or the witnesses.

(Id.,

pp.1369-70.) Finally, despite Fields' best efforts, despite the fact he has obtained new
affidavits from three trial witnesses, nowhere do any of the three witnesses recant any of
their trial testimony.
Even if the three new affidavits could be considered in conjunction with the latest
DNA evidence, neither the affidavits nor the DNA evidence, whether considered
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collectively or individually and reviewed with the compelling evidence presented at trial,
establish Fields has met his burden of proving they would probably produce an acquittal.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the district court's Memorandum and Order of
Dismissal summarily dismissing Fields' post-conviction claims be affirmed.
Dated this 29 th day of June, 2010.

Deputy Att0f9- General
Chief, CapiHil Litigation Unit
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